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Cages and Thresholds
In her essay “On Singularity and the Symbolic,” Carrie Rohman analyzes the way Italo Calvino’s character Mr. Palomar muses, in silent conver-
sations, about the boundaries that separate humans from other animals. 
Confronted with the enigmatic singularity of an albino gorilla named 
Snowflake, or with the neat classification of iguanas in a Parisian reptile 
house, Palomar searches for “an eternal or permanent system, structure, 
or taxonomy of meaning” (Rohman 73), a recognizable order whose valid-
ity would also extend outside cages and boxes. As though challenging the 
Darwinian evidence of biological continuity with the implicit evocation of 
a Linnaeus redivivus, Palomar dreams of a nostalgic taxonomy of “fixed” 
forms able to “resist the flux that undoes them and mixes and reshapes 
[them]”— forms “separated forever from the others, as here in a row of 
glass case- cages of the zoo” (Palomar 86). Calvino is well aware that this 
dream is an artful delusion: were species separated like cages in a zoo, 
the order of discourse would prevail over the complexity of nature and 
its ongoing metamorphosis (Rohman 73). Rohman writes, “[Palomar’s] 
description [of the zoo] points out the exaggerated and ultimately fantas-
tic idea that species are eternally distinct, that species barriers represent 
some permanent and reliable mode of differentiation. Rather, this passage 
implicitly exposes the human investment in inviolable and discreet [sic] 
life- forms. [. . .] Palomar longs for species barriers that are clear and unas-
sailable, but [. . .] such longings are more akin to humanist wish- structures 
than anything else” (73).
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The search for taxonomies is a concern that Calvino shares with two 
authors with whom he is often associated. Jorge Luis Borges’s famous 
“Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledges,” a (seemingly ficti-
tious) ancient Chinese encyclopedia, contains a curious taxonomy that 
pigeonholes living beings into 14 categories, including “(d) suckling pigs, 
(e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included 
in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, [. . .] 
(n) those that resemble flies from a distance” (Other Inquisitions 108). Years 
later, Borges insists that the experience of the animal realm is as “bewil-
dering” as a cognitive phenomenology of ever- emerging things: “[T]o dis-
cover the camel is itself no stranger than to discover a mirror or water or 
staircase” (Imaginary Beings 13). In Borges, like in Calvino, the emphasis 
falls on the ironic and de facto culturally arbitrary character of classifica-
tion systems. Another author, biographically closer to Calvino, the French 
oulipiste Georges Perec, describes the search for order as an extravagant 
occupation to which Mr. Bartlebooth, the Palomar- like protagonist of Life: 
A User’s Manual (1978), unsuccessfully devotes his existence: “Let us imag-
ine a man [. . .] of exceptional arrogance who wishes to fix, to describe, 
and to exhaust not the whole world [. . .] but a constituted fragment of the 
world: in the face of the inextricable incoherence of things, he will set out 
to execute a (necessarily limited) program right the way through, in all its 
irreducible, intact entirety” (117).
In all these cases, the attempt to define “orders of things” (Michel Fou-
cault’s reference to Borges’s “Celestial Emporium” is commonplace here; 
see Foucault, The Order of Things, xvi) and to map the fault lines between 
species and beings is at the very least problematic. If in Borges it is a cul-
tural construction, in Perec it is a hobby for wealthy male adults. In Cal-
vino, irony and epistemology go together. To sketch separations between 
life forms, in fact, is a way to counterbalance the inconsistency of the sub-
ject, which is in turn always permeable, always exposed to a world full of 
other and full of others.
But considered more closely, the question underlying Palomar’s solitary 
observations is not solely about a classification of living forms. Palomar 
focuses on thresholds, including the “threshold of the human,” as Rohman 
evinces, but his zoological adventures are just another occasion for Cal-
vino to explore— taking irony as a heuristic strategy— the way thresholds 
can be blurred, betrayed, deconstructed, hybridized, and remanipulated 
in narrative forms. In this essay, I will examine this tendency and criss-
cross Calvino’s works via the posthumanist lens of a “relational ontology” 
(Oppermann), maybe the most apt tool for reading through his universe 
of hybrids, evanescent thresholds, and “queer critters,” where the human 
world is a haphazard emergence on a “turbulent, immanent field in which 
various and variable materialities collide, congeal, morph, evolve, and dis-
integrate” (Bennett ix).
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In the stories of Palomar, Qfwfq, Priscilla, and his many “critters,” Cal-
vino shows how, as Latour puts it, “It is possible, to have our cake and eat 
it too— to be monists and make distinctions” (214). Calvino the monist— 
like Perec, and certainly like Borges— cuts his posthuman cake by tracing 
ironical distinctions. But, along with his reader, he is well aware that these 
lines are marked only in order to reinforce the narrative of connections in 
a universe of things that are, as Deleuze would say, “ontologically one, but 
formally diverse” (Expressionism 67). Through an ars combinatoria made 
of segments of potential natures and unstable material- semiotic orders, 
layers of history and layers of biology intermingle and interfere, spreading 
out a playful complexity of stories and beings, where literature becomes a 
form of cosmic knowledge and imagination a vibrant extension of reality.
Past the Human
Where do the boundaries of the human lie? Are there boundaries (literally) 
de- fining the division between the human and its other, and where do these 
borders lie? Or, more properly, where does the human’s “other” lie?1 To 
answer these questions, a belief in an essentialist vision about the human 
would certainly help. The human, according to this vision, would be an 
ontoepistemological category that doggedly emerged from the evolution-
ary struggle in order to stay fixed in its purity, simultaneously a being, an 
essence, and a theory. But is it really so? “I firmly believe that we have never 
been human,” Donna Haraway writes in “A Kinship of Feminist Figura-
tions”: “There is no border where evolution ends and history begins, where 
genes stop and environment takes up, where culture rules and nature sub-
mits, or vice versa. Instead, there are turtles and turtles of naturecultures 
all the way down. Every being that matters is a congeries of its formative 
histories” (2). Our existence, the existence of our species and its cogni-
tive evolution, is far from being pure and confined within secure margins. 
From the mitochondria all the way up, the human is constantly mixed with 
the nonhuman. It reveals itself by way of hybridizations. For this reason, a 
perfectly consequent atlas of human biology would be a treatise on xenobi-
ology. A compelling example is that of the bacteria colonies that constitute 
our microbiome. Even though they do not have anything “human” in their 
genetic code, they are an integral part of our body and our health. As Jane 
Bennett observes, “My ‘own’ body is material, and yet this materiality is 
not fully or exclusively human. My flesh is populated and constituted by 
different swarms of foreigners” (112).2 But let us also think of the way pol-
lutants, medicines, and humanly made substances— xenobiotics— become 
our resident aliens, interacting with our bodies “in unpredictable, uncon-
trollable ways” (Alaimo 24). Forms of environmental illness, for example 
multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), speak clearly about the way “human 
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bodies are coextensive with the natural, unnatural, and hybridized material 
world” (167).3
The cyborg is also a hybridization of the human: a mingled creature 
made of humanly built mechanisms and of “ourselves and other organic 
creatures in our unchosen ‘high- technological’ guise as information sys-
tems, texts, and ergonomically controlled labouring, desiring, and repro-
ducing systems” (Haraway, Simians 1). Against dualistic assumptions, 
humanity belongs “in the crossover” of agencies and presences, and like 
our everyday life, “our very body, is composed to a great extent of socio-
technical negotiations and artifacts” (Latour 214). If we keep these exam-
ples in mind next time we hydrate our skin, take an antibiotic, or see an 
advertisement for ear implants, the fact that humans are assemblages of 
organic and inorganic matter, and therefore blended with alien presences, 
will become suddenly clearer. In this light, our bodies are congregational 
entities always reminding us of “the very radical character of the (frac-
tious) kinship between the human and the nonhuman” (Bennett 112).
Calvino’s literary imagination is pervaded by this idea, and much of 
his narrative undertaking consists in mapping potential otherness within 
and around the human, in both its ontological and social categories. It is 
interesting how this vision emerges even in occasional writings, like “The 
Sky, Man, the Elephant” (“Il cielo, l’uomo, l’elefante”), a preface to Pliny the 
Elder’s Natural History, published in 1982 and included in Why Read the 
Classics? (Perché leggere i classici, 1991). In this treatise of things natural 
and of cultural anthropology avant la lettre, Calvino discovers humankind 
to be located in a pervious zone of forms and matters, precarious in its 
destiny of unpredictable metamorphoses. “Human beings form an area of 
the living world which must be defined by carefully drawing its boundar-
ies,” he remarks (Why Read 42). However, these boundaries are negotiable, 
and not only in the case of the unsuspected family ties that “spiritually” 
connect the human with the “reliqua animalia, [. . .] the other animated 
beings” (45). The human is also a technological hybrid of things and prod-
ucts, in a dimension that Latour would call a “collective” of humans and 
nonhumans. Calvino comments, in fact, that “[a]nticipating those mod-
ern anthropologists who maintain that there is a continuity between bio-
logical evolution and technological development, from palaeolithic tools 
to electronics, Pliny implicitly admits that the additions made by man to 
nature become an integral part themselves of [human] nature” (44).4 Here, 
the adverb “implicitly” tells us how Calvino thought about the structural 
hybridity of the human, where biological evolution and technological 
development are an open horizon of substantial transitions and oscilla-
tions. Against such a horizon, it is possible that future layers of existence 
will ironically reproduce the previous ones by turning their allegedly 
immovable order upside down. Think of the human- car- petrol symbiosis 
described in “The Petrol Pump” (“La pompa di benzina”), a short story 
written by Calvino in 1974: “The day the earth’s crust reabsorbs the cities, 
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this plankton sediment that was humankind will be covered by geological 
layers of asphalt and cement until in millions of years’ time it thickens into 
oily deposits, on whose behalf we do not know” (Numbers 175).
Open to transformations, the human is materially and historically per-
meable to other natures, other matters, and other cultural agents. To be 
properly human is therefore, in a certain sense, to go past the boundar-
ies of human “nature.” This is the meaning of posthumanism, as theorists 
such as Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, Roberto Marchesini, Bruno Latour, 
Andrew Pickering, Rosi Braidotti, or Cary Wolfe conceptualize it. For these 
authors, posthumanism is a vision of reality according to which the human 
and the nonhuman are confluent, coemergent, and defining each other in 
mutual relations. More precisely, a posthumanist vision rejects the essen-
tialist separation between the human and the nonhuman and, quite like 
Calvino’s narratives, emphasizes their hybridizations and their active inter-
play. Such a vision pictures a world whose ontological categories are per-
formed rather than given, where mixing with “anotherness” is the dynamic 
destination of being, and where the human is itself the result of intersect-
ing agencies and meanings. Its very meaning is that of a material- discursive 
consociability, built “through the pleasurable connection with the other, 
with the different, with whatever is able to produce new states of insta-
bility, thus reinforcing the human endeavor to conjugate with the world” 
(Marchesini 70).5 Against the posthumanist horizon, different forms of 
agency and materiality feed each other. There is communication within 
every fragment of existing materiality, and therefore our relationship with 
the world is of conjoined determination: “The world makes us in one and 
the same process in which we make the world” (Pickering 26). In this per-
formative account of being and knowing, human experience depends on 
and produces hybridizations. Not only are our bodies materially entangled 
with other bodies, but culture and every form of knowledge are discur-
sive processes of coupling with others: “[E]very culture is the outcome of a 
process of hybridization with an otherness” (Marchesini 15). In tune with 
Calvino’s vision of a world full of human aliens, posthumanism implies 
therefore a picture according to which, both in discursive and material 
terms, “otherness saturates the human structure [. . .] [H]umanity oozes 
with the nonhuman” (Marchesini 70).
But as Calvino will emphasize, the human is not alone in the cross-
over. A whole world of hybrids, collectives, and “critters” shares with us a 
horizon on which material forces concur with meanings in the process of 
hybridization that shapes our existence(s). Existence is composed of the 
“force of collective life” (Wheeler, Whole 30), and this force is expressive: 
if culture is an ongoing process of hybridization with nature, a continuous 
formation of “naturecultures,” to use Haraway’s vivid coinage, the force of 
life is also a force of signs and information, a semiotic force. It is a poten-
tial of stories inbuilt into matter. This world is not only a world of material 
emergences but also a world that becomes meaningful because meaning 
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coemerges with matter, as research in the field of biosemiotics shows.6 
The narrative landscape of posthumanism is a landscape of encounters, 
where “the organism- environment coupling is a form of conversation” 
(Wheeler, Whole 126), and where the human is constitutionally respon-
sive to “a universe which is— and perhaps always has been— ‘perfused 
with signs’” (155).
In the paragraphs that follow, I will trace the way these issues are devel-
oped in Calvino’s narratives. After an overview of works where such top-
ics are most visible, I will concentrate on Mr. Palomar (Palomar, 1983) 
and Cosmicomics (Le Cosmicomiche, 1965). These are, I would suggest, the 
main expressions of Calvino’s attempt to build stories that move the narra-
tive focus and strategy “past the human,” and where the tangle of matters, 
forms, and signs shapes “hybriditales”— stories in which reality itself is a 
continuous flow of crossings.
A World of Hybrids, Collectives, and Critters: Literature outside the Self
The human world emerging from Calvino’s posthumanist “hybriditales” is 
a combination of substances and meanings: as we have seen, only a game 
of proportions separates the human from the nonhuman, defining them 
as dif- ferents, as bearers of an internal split. For Calvino this split is pro-
foundly problematic and requires deconstruction. In his narratives, the 
entanglements with an otherness come often from within— from within 
the cells, like in Cosmicomics or t zero (T con zero, 1967), or from within 
the mind, the body, and their social categorization, like in The Watcher 
(La giornata di uno scrutatore, 1963). This short novel, in particular, is 
a reflection on the “borders of humanity,” where the very idea of being 
human, “essentially” enlightened by reason, is confronted with its own 
“odd” side: mental and physical illness. One of the most philosophically 
challenging among Calvino’s novels, The Watcher is the story of two days 
spent by an election watcher in Turin’s Cottolengo, a hospital for the men-
tally and physically disabled during the elections of 1953. Here, while the 
protagonist intensely meditates on “the boundary line between the Cot-
tolengo humans and the healthy” (The Watcher 36), the very concept of 
“humanity” is overcome by its internal alterity, and the human becomes a 
human alien, an anthropological form of wilderness.7
But hybridity and enmeshment with alterity are features that Calvino 
bestows also on other early characters, in works where the realism and 
conceptual depths of The Watcher are superseded by fantasy and ironic 
lightness. The trilogy Our Ancestors (I nostri antenati) is an interesting case 
in point: in The Baron in the Trees (Il barone rampante, 1957), as a deliber-
ate consequence of his hubristic refusal to eat snail soup, Cosimo Piovasco 
di Rondò turns into an “arboreal” man who will never touch the ground 
again, becoming part of Europe’s landscape of disappearing forests; The 
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Cloven Viscount (Il visconte dimezzato, 1952) is a moral hybrid of good 
and evil; The Nonexistent Knight (Il cavaliere inesistente, 1959) is a hybrid 
of matter and void, a presence- absence, alive only thanks to his armor 
(he is, we could say, a human- metal- crafted assemblage). In Marcovaldo, 
nature is an ironic hybrid of “urban nature,” which is “mischievous, coun-
terfeit, compromised with artificial life” (Calvino, “Presentazione” 1233). 
This nature is visible through its absence and its paradoxical appearances: 
mushrooms near a tram station, municipal pigeons, billboards mistaken 
for trees by kids who have never seen a forest, the pale light of the moon 
competing with the neon signs of a cognac brand. In Cosmicomics (and in 
the sequels, t zero, The Memory of the World, Cosmicomics Old and New)8 
the hybridization is extended to the entire universe, mediated through and 
concentrated in the indefinable Qfwfq, a “queer critter” who embodies the 
entire range of natural forms, possibility, and stories.9
Marcovaldo’s hybridized nature becomes Mr. Palomar’s landscape of 
naturecultures, a landscape of cheese, stones, gardens, tortoises, butcher 
shops, stars, geckoes, zoos, slippers, sand, and eyes. Here hybridity takes 
more explicitly the literal form of posthumanism, of a movement aimed to 
cross the boundaries of the human and to locate processes— whether cog-
nitive or formative— in a wider horizon of mutually dependent phenom-
ena. Palomar’s mind, in fact, is always strained between the “in- side” and 
the “out- side,” like a consciously permeable membrane connecting (and 
separating) the self and the world. Stretching the human beyond itself in 
space and in time, this coevolutionary gaze is an essential component of 
Calvino’s relational ontology. Palomar’s fluctuations between subjectivism 
(“All this is happening not on the sea, not in the sun, [. . .] but inside my 
head. [. . .] I am swimming in my mind” [15]) and objectivism (“If I see and 
think and swim the reflection, it is because at the other extreme there is the 
sun, which casts its rays. [. . .] All the rest is reflection among reflections, me 
included” [15]) are— if not overcome— conciliated in a geoevolutionary 
vision in which experiences and presences are occasional coemergences. 
Humans, too, are episodes in the world’s self- shaping:
Mr. Palomar thinks of the world without him: that endless world before his 
birth, and that far more obscure world after his death; he tries to imagine 
the world before eyes, any eyes; and a world that tomorrow, through catas-
trophe or slow corrosion, will be left blind. What happens (happened, will 
happen) in that world? Promptly an arrow of light sets out from the sun, is 
reflected in the calm sea, sparkles in the tremolo of the water; and then mat-
ter becomes receptive to light, is differentiated into living tissues, and all of a 
sudden an eye, a multitude of eyes, burgeons, or reburgeons. (18)
This passage is the typical example of the human’s material and his-
torical porosity, of its contiguity with other natures and agents. Like all 
other physical systems, humans do not exist a priori or separately; the 
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scale of their existence is participatory and relational. In the dicey process 
of evolutionary causality, humans “happen” in a world of spontaneously 
concurring phenomena, outside any preexisting order or harmony. The 
“before- and- after” sequence taking place in Palomar’s mind is therefore 
not a way to delimit the human as a chronological or ontological water-
shed. It is rather an instant movie that recapitulates evolutionary path-
ways tracing them back to the unpredictable ways nature’s “agentic force 
[. . .] interacts with and changes the [. . .] elements in the mix, including 
the human” (Alaimo and Hekman 7). Far from ruling the world in its 
ongoing evolution, order and harmony are only a misleading human pro-
jection, a vague aspiration. In fact, as Palomar says, between humankind 
and world, “there is a sense of possible harmony, as if between two nonho-
mogeneous harmonies: that of the nonhuman in a balance of forces that 
seems not to correspond to any pattern, and that of human structures, 
which aspires to the rationality of a geometrical or musical composition, 
never definitive” (94).
This structural impermanence justifies and spawns the observational 
attitude displayed by Mr. Palomar, whose name recalls an astronomic 
observatory in California. While using this quality, Calvino is perfectly 
aware that objectivity is a mere regulative ideal, in the first place because 
the human eye is conditioned by biocultural factors. Nonetheless, the 
eyes of a human can be open to a world in which all things inexhaust-
ibly emerge and converge. This explains a narrative and linguistic strategy 
that, in almost all Calvino’s late works, becomes more and more antimeta-
physical and antisubjective: only if the human self recedes can the world 
be visible and eloquent. Here, instead of a knowledge based on depth, and 
therefore on hierarchy, whether of objectivity or subjectivity, Calvino priv-
ileges a nonhierarchical way of looking, knowing, and describing phenom-
ena. This both inverts and enlarges our cognitive patterns: “It is only after 
you have come to know the surface of things [. . .] that you can venture to 
seek what is underneath. But the surface of things is inexhaustible” (55). 
Only in a perceptive and conceptual horizon made of silence, of hearing, 
of observing, can humans acquire familiarity with the world in which they 
occur: a world both before and after the human one, inhabited by things 
and beings proving that “the world of man is not eternal and is not unique” 
(Palomar 86).
If the world is narratable only through the silence of the ego, literature 
mirrors this paradox, this ambivalence between silence and narration. Sus-
tained by a vision of imagination as a creative force, a “means to attain a 
knowledge that is outside the individual, outside the subjective” (Calvino, 
Six Memos 91), literature can explore how the world progressively opens to 
itself. In this openness, Calvino situates Palomar’s attempt to mingle his 
existence and perspective with the existence of other beings, whether geck-
oes, grasses, slippers, tortoises, or birds. For example, as Palomar assumes 
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the perspective of a bird flying over the rooftops, the categories of experi-
ence are moved “past the human” again, and the self is outspread:
Nothing of this can be seen by one who moves on his feet or his wheels over 
the city pavements. And, inversely, from up here you have the impression 
that the true crust of the earth is this, uneven but compact, [. . .] and it never 
occurs to you to wonder what is hidden [. . .]. This is how birds think, or at 
least is how Mr. Palomar thinks, imagining himself a bird. “It is only after 
you have come to know the surface of things,” he concludes, “that you can 
venture to seek what is underneath. But the surface of things is inexhaust-
ible.” (Palomar 54– 55)
Palomar is an extended ego, a self “outside the subjective.” He is the inter-
section of city, birds, plants, roofs, things, and himself as a human indi-
vidual who tries to “escape subjectivity” (38), not so much in order to reach 
a supposed objectivity, but rather to embrace a wider portion of the never- 
ending surface of things. Here, while the posthuman finds the form of 
an urban- animal- architectonic- cultural- vegetable assemblage, Rome, the 
city’s experiences and bodies, the humans, and the birds form a collective. 
In this collective, unexpectedly, the human finds itself in a relationship of 
communication based on sharing a landscape of materiality and signs, a 
situation that can be addressed using the words of the ecophenomenolo-
gist David Abram:
It is the reticence, the inexhaustible otherness of things, that enables them to 
hold my gaze, to sustain themselves in my awareness. I can never plumb all 
the secrets of even a single blade of grass [. . .] or the totality of the relations 
that it sustains [. . .] because I am not a disembodied mind [. . .], because, 
that is, I myself am a body, a material being of weight and density like this 
tree or that stone [. . .]. Because, finally, I am thing myself, and hence have 
only a finite access to the things around me. (43)10
The human is a finite being among other finite beings, and this finitude is 
the horizon for the ontological crossover in which humans, nonhumans, 
and their stories belong. Likewise, Calvino’s reflections on the human- 
bovine’s coimplication also emphasize the hybridity of the human and of 
its “naturecultural” reality: “[T]he man- beef symbiosis [. . .] has guaran-
teed the flourishing of what is called human civilization, which at least in 
part should be called human- bovine” (Palomar 77– 78).
Calvino highlights the need to describe the story (and nature) of human 
civilization in the perspective of its intersection with the stories (and 
natures) of others. But these stories could also be inverted, or written from 
perspectives that are not necessarily human- centered. After all, humans, 
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too, are parts of the metabolic cycles of nature’s economy: if we incorpo-
rate “the world’s flesh” into our own “it can only be so because we, too, are 
edible. Because we, too, are food” (Abram 62). Thus Calvino radically ush-
ers in a narrative microcosmology, enunciated in “Being Stone” (“Essere 
pietra”), a two- page monologue “in Palomar’s style” written in 1981 for an 
exhibit of sculptures by Alberto Magnelli. Here a stone speaks and reflects 
on the entanglement of agencies and elements that characterizes the tem-
porality and stories of impersonal matter:
[T]he stones’ time is concentrated in our interior, where ages thicken and 
sediment [. . .]. But our story lies also upon us, it is carved on our dented 
and broken and whittled surface [. . .]. And I am not talking only of a mineral 
story of rocks, which are subjected to slides, exfoliations, erosions, slow flows 
or sudden cataclysms. I am talking of a story marked by human tools, too: by 
the helical band of the electric saw that, sliding, cleaves its groove in the hard 
cohesion of molecules; by the well- aimed chisel stroke; by the crack- opening 
wedge that has been struck by the hammer; by the frenzied explosion of the 
mine. (“Essere pietra” 420)
As Manuel De Landa put it, “[I]n a nonlinear world in which the same 
processes of self- organization take place in the mineral, organic, and 
cultural spheres, perhaps rocks hold some of the keys to understanding 
[. . .] humanity [. . .] and all [its] mixtures” (70).11 While advancing along 
the paths of the human’s structural “mixtures,” we are accompanied in a 
migration outside the human, and thus ipso facto outside the subject, in 
a process through which the very category of identity is reconfigured. In 
Mr. Palomar’s closing chapter this issue is matter of a very intense scrutiny:
[H]ow can you look at something and set your own ego aside? Whose eyes 
are doing the looking? As a role, you think of the ego as one who is peering 
out of your own eyes as if leaning on a window sill, looking at the world 
stretching out before him in all its immensity. So, then: a window looks out 
on the world. The world is out there; and here, what do we have? The world, 
still— what else could there be? [. . .] perhaps the “I,” the ego, is simply the 
window through which the world looks at the world. To look at itself the 
world needs the eyes (and the eyeglasses) of Mr. Palomar. (114)
These words, published in 1982,12 obey the logic Calvino expressed in a 
1967 interview, where he declared, “I believe that the world exists inde-
pendently from the human; it existed before the human and will exist after 
it, and the human is only an opportunity that the world has to organize 
some information about itself. Therefore literature is for me a number of 
attempts to know and organize information about the world” (Romanzi e 
HYBRIDITALES   225
racconti II 1347). In Calvino’s mind, literature has both creative and cogni-
tive functions, which can extend our experience “outside the individual 
and outside the subjective” but also explore the realm of potentialities that 
lies “out there.” Again in Six Memos, hybridity emerges as a realization of 
a nonsubjective imagination and of the interconnected potentialities of 
more- than- human existence: “Think what it would be to have a work con-
ceived from outside the self, a work that would let us escape the limited 
perspective of the individual ego, [. . .] give speech to that which has no 
language, to the bird perching on the edge of the gutter, to the tree in spring 
and the tree in the fall, to stone, to cement, to plastic.” (124).
The literature “outside the self” that Calvino describes is a creative 
apprehension of things that includes the self only as long as its conscious-
ness is not superimposed on the totality of phenomena. Quoting Carlo 
Emilio Gadda, in fact, Calvino emphasizes that, while modern novels are a 
way to know and recreate the complexity of the world, “to know is to insert 
something into what is real, and hence to distort reality” (Six Memos 108). 
In this process, the self profoundly interferes with the world, changing it 
irremediably: consciousness, as Haraway says, “changes the geography of 
all previous categories; it denatures them as heat denatures a fragile pro-
tein” (“Manifesto” 16). The object of a literature “from outside” escapes the 
borders of definitive morphologies and converges instead in processes of 
mixing and becoming. In so doing, this literature contemplates not “life” 
generally taken but rather the pure asubjective stream of vitality of what 
Gilles Deleuze would call “a life”— that is, “an immanent life carrying with 
it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and 
objects” (Immanence 29). These asubjective narratives draw attention “not 
to a world of human design or their accidental, accumulated effects, but to 
an interstitial field of non- personal ahuman forces, flows, tendencies, and 
trajectories” (Bennett 61).
Going past the human and finding the narrative pathways of its hybrid-
izations with other beings is what a posthumanist literature par excellence 
does. In this framework, the Cosmicomics are an important station on the 
way toward Mr. Palomar’s postsubjectivity. In the infinite forms and mat-
ters assumed by Qfwfq, Calvino expresses both the contingency of the 
human as a cosmic actor and the expansive asubjective and aindividual 
narrativity of things in their evolutionary becoming, from atoms to plan-
etary forces. The Cosmicomics are the history of a hybridizing universe. Sci-
entific hypotheses give Calvino the cue for imagining stories whose main 
character is the unpronounceable Qfwfq, an unstoppable flow of material- 
semiotic stages that speaks, plays, and evolves using the human as a form 
of representative mimicry. Qfwfq is everything: a nebula, a simple cluster 
of primordial matter, a dinosaur on the verge of becoming extinct, a mam-
mal just emerged from its previous evolutionary stage of pulmonate fish. 
Qfwfq is the universe in its synchronic and diachronic metamorphoses, 
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the whole presenting itself in different fragments. In its very narrative 
strategy, this book is based on a stylistic- cognitive hybridization: scientific 
hypotheses and theories are first quoted in an opening paragraph and then 
ironically anthropomorphized and disguised as the settings for everyday 
situations. The result is a cosmological Darwinism, a collective evolution-
ary biography of the world in which Qfwfq is and becomes a huge number 
of things, reminding us of the permeability and continuity of every being.
Moving from subatomic particles to dinosaurs, from empty space to 
chaos, Qfwfq’s identity is asubjective, open, and relational. It is an eco-
logical and hybridized identity, based on the osmotic- semiotic exchange 
between the self and the other, the inside and the outside. In “Identity” 
(“Identità”), a short autobiographic essay of 1977, Calvino wrote that “my 
personal identity is crisscrossed by the genetic continuity that gets splin-
tered and meshed in apparently separated individuals” (2825); “the most 
solid and self- confident identity is nothing but a sort of bag or hosepipe 
full of swirling heterogeneous stuff” (2825– 27). Every form of identity, 
whether individual or social, is definable and understandable only through 
the relationship it has with the “outside”: “[I]t is the outside that defines 
the inside, in the horizon of space, as well as in the vertical dimension of 
time” (2827). Similarly, Qfwfq’s identity is transitive and transitional; it is 
made of “swirling heterogeneous stuff.” In spite of the anthropomorphism 
of the narrative, here the human is not simply leveled out but restructured 
in terms of complexity.
In its hybridizing flows, Qfwfq points at the “other” (others) that is 
(are) present within the human and, at the same time, at a human that 
is present in its “other.” In its material indifference to forms and states, to 
being individual or collective, Qfwfq is the typical example of what post-
humanist thought calls a “critter,” a being/thing that is “material, specific, 
non- self- identical, and semiotically active” (Haraway, When Species 250). 
Critters are, exactly like Qfwfq, animate beings “where the line between 
‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’ is taken as given, rather than an effect of par-
ticular boundary- drawing practices” (Barad, “Nature’s Queer” 127). These 
boundaries are, in fact, always kept open, and for this very reason, a critter 
“is already internally queer, having contrary associations as a term defined 
both in contrast to or as distinct from humans (as in its reference to ani-
mate nonhumans), and, in relation to humans (e.g., as a term of reproba-
tion or contempt, but also sometimes as term of affection or tenderness).” 
In an important sense, therefore, critters— like Qfwfq— “do not have 
inherently determinate identities, by definition” (ibid.).
“The Spiral” (“La spirale”) exemplifies Calvino’s representation of this 
“internally queer” world of associations and its blurred boundaries of 
space- time- matter. Here Qfwfq is a marine organism that, out of love, pro-
duces its shell and recognizes it as a nucleus of further development and 
determination. This organism prompts the emergence of a spiraling con-
stellation that encompasses, “five hundred million years” later, a congeries 
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of beings: pyramids and Egyptian airlines, Spinoza and the “Spinoza” entry 
in a Dutch encyclopedia, a Neolithic mattock buried into a field and the 
mattock of the peasant that unburies it, Herodotus and those who read 
him in bilingual editions, a cloud of bees, coal, horoscopes, Cleopatra, and 
films about Cleopatra (Cosmicomics 147– 48). Identity, like reality, is here 
a process of mutual determination of interconnected phenomena, not a 
property of individuals. It is “diffracted through itself” (Barad, “Nature’s 
Queer” 126) and open to multiplicity.
In the Cosmicomics and their sequels, the striving toward becoming 
multiple— and toward multiple becomings— is represented as intrinsic to 
an agentic universe that uses itself as a partner and as a language. One of 
the most significant examples of this dynamic is “Priscilla,” a tale from t 
zero in which Calvino describes the phenomenology of a vibrantly active 
matter busy organizing itself and moved by love, perception, imagination, 
consciousness, and memory. In this journey of self- organization, Qfwfq, 
a “loving/desiring” cell, produces other beings and meanings, marked by 
the emergence of plurality within the nucleus: “[M]y state of desire, my 
state- motion- desire of motion- desire- love moved me to say, and since the 
only thing I had to say was myself, I was moved to say myself, to express 
myself. [. . .] [A]ll this me was a place where there was everything except 
me: what I mean is, I had the sense of being inhabited, no, of inhabiting 
myself. No, of inhabiting a me inhabited by others” (68– 69). This plural-
ity is our immanent destiny. Generation by generation, it is inscribed in 
our cells and becomes a future- producing memory in which every move 
appears like a recapitulation of the past: “[O]nce we’ve established that 
what I call ‘I’ consists of a certain number of amino acids which line up in 
a certain way, it’s logical that inside these molecules all possible relations 
are foreseen” (Cosmicomics 79).
Here Calvino, with one of his tranquil coups de théâtre, moves us to 
another landscape, one derived from the transformation of cells, their 
loves, and their combinations:
All we can say is that in certain points and moments that interval of void 
which is our individual presence is grazed by the wave which continues to 
renew the combinations of molecules [. . .] and this is enough to give us the 
certitude that somebody is ‘I’ and somebody is ‘Priscilla’ in the temporal and 
spatial distribution of the living cells [. . .]. This is in itself enough, Priscilla, 
to cheer me, when I bend my outstretched neck over yours and I give you a 
little nip on your yellow fur and you dilate your nostrils, bare your teeth and 
kneel on the sand, lowering your hump to the level of my breast so that I can 
lean on it and press you from behind bearing down on my rear legs. (85– 86)
In this vorticous horizon in which language and consciousness, mem-
ory and love, pop up from bubbling oceans of matter, it does not matter 
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whether a human voice is used to let a cell speak of its (our) semiotic desire 
or is lent to a camel to recall his (our) mating joy.
“Priscilla”— like Calvino’s numerous “hybriditales” on biological 
themes— is theoretically mirrored in a passage from A Thousand Plateaus: 
“[A]ll becomings are already molecular. [. . .] Starting from the forms one 
has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the functions one fulfills, 
becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes the relations 
of movement and the rest [. . .]. This is the sense in which becoming is the 
process of desire. [. . .] It indicates [. . .] a zone of proximity or copresence.” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 300– 301). And like Deleuze’s and Guattari’s, Cal-
vino’s subjects are nomadic subjects distributed in a space without enclo-
sures or boundaries. Embracing multiple perspectives of subjectivity and 
identity, Calvino’s narrative technique, especially in Mr. Palomar and Cos-
micomics, is also nomadic and deterritorialized. By tracing the genealogy 
of life back to the universe’s genealogy, Calvino rewrites human history in 
a more inclusive way, enacting a “creative sort of becoming” and staging a 
“performative metaphor that allows for otherwise unlikely encounters and 
unsuspected sources of interaction, experience, and knowledge” (Braidotti 
38).
Blurring Boundaries without Burning Bridges: Conclusions
In her essay “Otherworldly Conversations, Terran Topics, Local Terms,” 
Haraway reflects on the “stunning narrative [. . .] of structural- functional 
complexity” in which all living forms are “bound together in the ultra- 
structural tissues of our being” (163). She writes, “We must engage in 
forms of life with the nonhumans [. . .]. Refiguring conversations with 
those who are not ‘us’ must be part of that project” (174). A posthumanist 
vision based on pathways of hybridization and on dynamic entanglements 
where “mind, body and environment [form] a processual continuum” 
(Wheeler, Whole 22) does not deny the human as such but rather covers 
the distance between us and “those who are not ‘us,’” “blurring boundar-
ies without burning bridges” (Braidotti 26). This vision aims to relocate 
the human— and the nonhuman— in a (non- Platonic) horizon in which 
“being” is not synonymous with “essence” or “nature.” In this monist hori-
zon, distinctions define and connect phenomena, which are not “facts” 
but coemergences of concurring agencies. Posthumanism is also a more 
“humane” form of humanism— a humanism more inclusive of human 
others and aware of the (inner and outer) exposure, openness, and vul-
nerability that characterize the human. As Mr. Palomar, Cosmicomics, and 
also The Watcher show, if the human has thresholds and boundaries, these 
are so subtle that they can be eluded and taken as a chance to reshape our 
categories of experience, opening borders for reconjunctions.
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Calvino’s critters, their “hybriditales,” give relevant instructions about 
how to restore the conversation with “those who are not ‘us.’” To ask what 
the world looks like where there are no eyes to see it, or to lend human 
voice to cells, camels, atoms, and stars, is an exercise in restructuring “oth-
erworldy conversations.” It implies a welcoming dimension for a human so 
mature that it can find itself by going past itself. And maybe, after “posthu-
manizing” Calvino, we could do the same with another classic: Henry David 
Thoreau. We could start with this famous passage from Walden: “Not until 
we are lost [. . .] do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and 
the infinite extent of our relations” (459). Here, clearly and unmistakably, 
cognitively and ontologically, the human’s hybridizing nature shines in the 
luminous form of a declaration of interdependence.
Notes
 1. For a development of this question in biosemiotic terms, see Timo 
Maran, “Where Do Your Borders Lie? Reflections on the Semiotical 
Ethics of Nature.”
 2. Analyzing this issue more closely, Bennett discusses the crook of the 
human elbow, “a special ecosystem, a bountiful home to no fewer 
than six tribes of bacteria,” noting that the “bacteria in the human 
microbiome collectively possess at least 100 times as many genes as 
the mere 20,000 or so in the human genome” (citation from Nicholas 
Wade, “Bacteria Thrive in Crook of Elbow, Lending a Hand,” New 
York Times, May 23, 2008; see Bennett, Vibrant Matter 112).
 3. On this coextensivity, Alaimo articulates her notion of transcorpore-
ality, a “movement across bodies” that reveals “the interchanges and 
interconnections between various bodily natures” (2).
 4. In the English version, the last crucial adjective (“human”) has been 
mistakenly omitted.
 5. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own.
 6. First developed in the works of Charles Sanders Peirce and Jakob 
von Uexküll, biosemiotics is “the study of signs and significance 
in all living things” (Wheeler, Whole 19). As Timo Maran puts it, 
“[S]ign processes take place not only in human culture but also 
everywhere in nature [. . .] Meaning is the organising principle of 
nature” (455, 461). Therefore “all living things— from the humblest 
forms of single- cell life upward— [. . .] are engaged in sign relations” 
(Wheeler, “Biosemiotic Turn” 271).
 7. I have analyzed this novel in my essay “The Wilderness of the Human 
Other.”
 8. The original Italian titles of these last two books are La memoria del 
mondo e altre storie cosmicomiche (1968) and Cosmicomiche vecchie e 
nuove (1984). Cosmicomics, a collection of 12 short stories on the life 
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of the universe, first appeared in 1965. During the following twenty 
years, Calvino wrote several other “cosmicomics” books and several 
scattered tales. Most of these “cosmicomic stories,” in English trans-
lation, are collected in The Complete Cosmicomics (2011).
 9. For an ecocritical interpretation of Cosmicomics, see Iovino “Quanto 
scommettiamo? Ecologia letteraria, educazione ambientale e Le Cos-
micomiche di Italo Calvino.” On “queer critters” as beings that “do 
not have inherently determinate identities, by definition” (127) see 
Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity.”
 10. Abram actually used Mr. Palomar as a source of inspiration for his 
“earthly cosmology,” as he himself declares (285).
 11. For considerations about stone and posthumanism, see Jeffrey J. 
Cohen, “Stories of Stone,” and the intriguing ecocritical development 
proposed by Cohen in Animal, Vegetal, Mineral: Ethics and Objects.
 12. Before being incorporated into Mr. Palomar, the text of this chapter 
appeared in French (translated by Jacques Roubaud) in the July– 
August 1982 issue of the Cnac Magazine, the journal of the Centre 
national d’art et de culture Georges Pompidou.
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